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The ex-communist  countries  of Europe as well  as Soviet  Union want to 
find a way  out of the command  economy to a market  system.  The common  advice 
(e.g., Lipton  and Sachs, Kornai) has been to go quickly  "all the way" to a 
fully capitalist  economy.  The difficulties  of this policy  are now becoming 
clear. 
This paper  argues  that a "middle way" with many  socialist  elements  is an 
attractive  path  for these countries,  for both  the transition  and as a long- 
term goal.  Economic  reform  of ex-communist  countries  must be based  on two 
core elements.  First,  the primacy  of law and stable  private  property  rights 
must be assured.  Second,  free markets must be  the basis  of economic 
relations.  \ 
How could  reform  then be a middle way?  First,  firms must be independent 
entities  owned by  shareholders  and responsible  for making  a profit, but the 
owners can include  local, provincial  (republic) and national  governments, 
workers,  and social  institutions  providing pensions  and insurance.  Government 
ownership  has not made Volkswagen,  Lufthansa  or Japan  Air Lines  economic 
failures. 
Second, market  are institutions  that must be developed.  It is 
particularly  important  for a society without  accepted  norms  and laws regarding 
market behavior  to develop  them, and to evolve  efficient  private  contracts. 
Government  legal codes can help.  Finally,  regulation  can provide  some of the 
security  of socialist  systems  and Western welfare  states. 
The economic  case for a middle way  is supported  by  its widespread 
success,  including  Austria,  Germany's  "social market"  economy,  Sweden, Canada 
and Japan.  The cultural  case is based on an economy's  need  to be reasonably 
consistent  with  its society's  customs and norms.  It is less of a shock for an 
ex-communist  society  to move  to the "middle way"  than  to a purely  capitalist 
society. Why the Ex-Communist  Countries  should take the "Middle Way" 
To the Market  Economy 
1.  Introduction 
U.S.  economists  have  largely agreed  on a solution  to the economic 
problems  of the ex-Communist  countries:  establish  a U.S.-style  economy  as 
quickly  as possible.'  This paper  argues  that such a goal is inappropriate. 
Rather,  these countries  should  find a "middle way"  that is based  on the 
primacy  of free markets,  but  includes  considerable  public  ownership  and a 
strong welfare  state.  It is a path  similar  to that of Sweden  in some ways,  to 
Germany  in others,  and to Japan  in still others. 
What  are the advantages  of a middle  way?  It lets their economies  be 
consistent  with  their society's history  and cultural  values.  Such successful 
capitalist  economies  as the United  States, Japan,  and the Western  European 
countries  have  quite varied  economic  institutions  and these differences  are 
related  to their different historical  experiences  and cultural patterns  (Kreps 
1990, North  1990, Zald 1990, p. 90).  For example,  the white-collarfilue- 
collar  dichotomy  in U.S.  industry has roots in firms with native white  foremen 
and immigrant  workers  (Edwards 1978).  So it is reasonable  to take a society's 
culture  into account  when devising  economic  policy,  just as one would  take 
into account  that society's  skills,  educational  levels, natural  resources,  and 
factories. 2 
The ex-communist  countries  have  quite varied  cultures,  and therefore 
their  transition  to markets  should vary.  For example,  Polish  society  is far 
more  individualistic  than Russian  society,  so reform policies  favoring  highly 
individualistic  behavior  patterns  will be more successful  in Poland.  The 
United  States  can often be a model  for Poland due to both  societies' 
individualism.  In contrast,  the strongly  authoritarian,  egalitarian  and 
conformist  tradition of Russia  (see, e.g., Kolchin  1987) suggest  that 
continental  models  such as Germany,  Austria  and Sweden might be more' 
appropriate.  It is also crucial  that the new value  of democratic  rule, has 
been  adopted by all of these countries.  Even a communist  party must now  try 
to gain popular  approval. 
Before  turning to specific  policy  models,  it is worth  dealing  with  the 
argument  that any  intermediate  policy  is wrong.  According  to many  advocates, 
one should  "let the market  work"  and make adjustments  only when major  problems 
develop.  The basic  rationale  is that competition  by private  firms  in markets 
is the only efficient policy.  Proponents  would appeal  to the neoclassical 
general  equilibrium  model  or to the Chicago  school supply  and demand  model,  or 
to the Austrian  model of entrepreneurship.  None has any place  for a society's 
culture.  A secondary  rationale  is that the leaders and bureaucrats  of the old 
communist  system  are fundamentally  hostile  to change  and will  try to reimpose 
their traditional  methods  of control using any tools available  (Kornai  1990). 
If they are required  to operate,  say, rate-of-return  regulation  of electric 
utilities  (a nearly universal  form of government  regulation  of industry),  they 
will  instead  reimpose  the traditional  command  economy. 
Part of the neoclassical  and Chicago  stories  is clearly  valid: 
competitive  markets  are a highly  successful  way to organize  economies.  But neoclassical  theory has  little  to say about the organizational 
and nothing  to say about  specific property  right rules  and the 
3 
form of firms 
relevance  of 
culture.  These questions  are assumed away in order  to model  markets.  Yet 
industrial  organization  and comparative  economic  systems &  deal with property 
right systems  and with  the relationship  of culture  and economics.  They  find 
that a wide  range of property  rights systems are efficient.'  Similarly,  many 
divisions  between  the public  and private  sectors  are efficient.  In addition, 
there is some evidence 
in one society but  can 
Examples  include  the U 
that a property  rights  system  can be highly  efficient 
fail in a society with  a quite  different  culture. 
S.-style  system of property  rights  in the Philippines 
and the British  legal system  in India. 
The second  argument,  that the entrenched  communist  bureaucracy  will 
fight all change,  is a serious concern:  they will probably  do just  that if 
they can.3  So there are severe disadvantages  to letting  anv current bureaus 
survive.  And  the bureaucrats  have established  behavior  patterns  that they 
will  follow  in any other bureau.  So the use of current  bureaus  and 
bureaucrats  should be minimized.  Yet the dramatic  change  from Communist  Party 
control  to democracy  may convince bureaucrats  that they must  accept  "the will 
of the people."  Thus, policies  that need bureaucrats  need not be opposed  per 
se.  Rather,  agent  discretion  should be minimized.  Policies  should have  fixed 
and transparent  rules  that will  resist manipulation.  And when possible,  new 
administrative  units  should be created  in place  of the previous  bureaucracies. 
In this move  to a rule of law, these units could  follow juridical  rulemaking 
procedures  (as do most U.S.  independent  agencies),  rather  than imposing 
regulations  by  fiat as in the past.4  Even so, the tradition  of favoratism 
will have  to be  fought  everywhere  in these bureaucratic  ex-communist  societies 4 
(e.g.,  Telgarsky  and Struyk 1990, p.  58). 
2.  The Necessity  of Stable  Property  Rights  and Free Markets 
Successful  economic  reform  requires  two policies:  stable  private 
property  rights and the primacy  of free markets.  These policies  are also 
sufficient,  as the details 
as who  owns what property, 
including  a "middle way." 
of property  rules and market  arrangements,  as well 
can be successfully  arranged  in numerous  ways, 
Thus,  the core of this proposal  is that firms be 
required  to survive  in free market  competition.  (It is presumed  that  the 
economy has  a stable currency  and thus a monetary  and credit  reform  as well  as 
reformed  banking  and credit  institutions;  see McKinnon  1991).5 
Economic  theory shows that free-market  competition  assures  the same 
market  outcomes  under a variety  of economic  institutions.6  The competitive 
pressure  of existing  firms and free entry  of new firms assure  that any firm 
that fails  to provide  goods at minimum  cost will be driven  out of business. 
Firms must provide  goods that consumers  want, pay for labor and materials,  and 
have profits  left over or they cannot  survive.  This result holds  not just  for 
profit-maximizing  firms but also labor-managed  firms  (Vanek 1970, Bonin  and 
Putterman  1987) and profit-sharing  firms  (Weitzman  1983, Koford  and Miller 
1991).  The practice  of capitalist  economies  also shows economic  success  for a 
wide variety  of economic  forms.  One can find industries  in which  stock-market 
capitalism  dominates  in some countries,  family  firms in others,  government- 
owned  firms in some and cooperatives  and partnerships  elsewhere. 
Markets  will  force efficiency  on all types of firms,  if they are  free to 
adjust  their production  methods  and output,  and to freely enter  and exit  the 5 
industry.  Free entry and exit  is the most powerful  element  in the long run, 
while  the extent of competition  among existing  firms  is most  crucial  in the 
short run.' 
A second reason  to favor market  competition  is that  innovation  is most 
likely  in such markets.  The communists'  bureaucratic  control  of industry 
failed  to encourage  innovation,  despite  immense efforts  (Berliner  1976).  The 
failure  of the Soviet economy  to innovate despite  all efforts  was  the biggest 
single  reason why  Soviet  intellectuals  favored  the radical  changes  that became 
Gorbachev's  glasnost  and perestroika  (Shlapentokh  1988, Hosking  1990 p. 2). 
In contrast,  innovation  prevaaails  where  open competition  and entry are 
permitted.'  So the move  to a market  system will by  itself  solve  the 
innovation  problem  that communist  systems unsuccessfully  grappled  with. 
The stable and assured  private property  rights  of economics  textbooks 
are an abstract,  even impossible  ideal.  For example,  transactions  costs are 
never  zero  in the real world.  Yet a reasonable  approximation  to such rights 
exists  in most developed  economies.  Their  importance  is shown by  the failure 
of economies  lacking  them.  Economic historians,  particularly  Douglass  North 
(North and Thomas  1973, North  1990, North and Weingast  1989)  show that 
insecure property  rights  ensures poverty  for a country.  Development 
economists  have also shown  that without  a stable  system  of private  property 
rights,  economic  development  of a country  is unlikely  (Bates  1981, Klitgaard 
1990, de Soto 1988).  No one will  invest  in a business  that can easily be 
confiscated.  And  there are few benefits  to learning productive  economic 
skills  in a society without  protected  property  rights.  Rather,  gains come 
from learning  to capture  others' wealth  (Bhagwati's DUP activities  [1982]).g 6 
Property  rights without  the free exchange  of goods through markets  are 
meaningless,  so economic  reform  requires  the combination  of full private 
property  rights  and markets.  The next two sections  describe  reforms  creating 
property  rights  and markets  consistent with  the customs  and values  of the ex- 
communist  countries.  The analysis  describes  reforms  in some detail  to 
illustrate  "middle way" market  reforms and show that they are workable. 
3.  Creating  Secure Property Rights  \ 
To create  secure property  rights  in a formerly  communist  country,  it is 
necessary  to establish  the rule of law protecting  productive  private  property 
(Litwack 1989).  And people  must know that these laws will be respected  by  the 
government  and the public.  Democratic  countries  often  (not always)  develop 
respect  for law, and the popular  support for the government  may have  that 
effect  in Poland,  while  the Soviet government's  lack of legitimacy  hinders  the 
public's  acceptance  of Soviet  1aw.l'  However,  before  people  can know that 
property  rights  will be protected,  private  firms, particularly  corporations, 
must actively  exercise  those rights.  I turn first to the task of creating 
private  property  from state enterprises. 
Virtually  all of the productive  assets  and organizations  in the ex- 
communist  countries  remains  owned by the state.  (The major  exception  is 
private  farmland  in Poland).  Proponents  of U.S.  -style capitalism  have argued 
that these should  be quickly  sold off in a Thatcher-style  series  of sales,  or 
perhaps  in a distribution  of stock rights  to all citizens."  However,  this 
policy has bogged  down, and it appears  to face insuperable  practical  and 
political  hurd1es.l' The alternative  is to begin by establishing  legally  recognized 
corporations  to own the large productive  enterprises.  Small productive 
assets--shops,  restaurants,  small repair and service  establishments--can  be 
sold off at auction,  as Czechoslavakia  has recently begun  to do  (Economist, 
February  2 1991, p. 71).13  And  individuals  must be free to establish  new 
private  firms and corporations  as they choose.  Large  enterprises  that are 
wholly  government-owned  can be  turned  fairly quickly  into private 
corporations.  The main difficulty  is establishing  just what  a particular 
enterprise  actually  owns, what  its assets are, and in particular  what  its 
financial  assets  and liabilities  may be.14 
Once  enterprises  have been  defined as private  corporations,  they will 
have  stock ownership  (along with  some bond debt).  The stock in each 
corporation  can be  issued and sold to a variety  of parties.  A number  of 
experts  have  proposed  such distributions,  and their conclusions  are similar.15 
I will  describe  one specific approach, but  the details  are less important  than 
the basic  principle  that stock distribution  and sale should assure  fairness 
and efficiency,  and major  social  interests  should not be neglected.  Some 
stock should be  sold at a low price  to current workers  and managers.  A 
moderate  proportion,  perhaps  5-lo%,  should be sold at auction  to the public, 
including  foreign buyers.l"  This will create  enough  "outside"  shareholders 
that a market  in the stock can develop,  and with  it, market  valuation  of the 
firms.  The bulk  of the stock should be  turned over  to government  units-- 
national,  provincial  (republic),  and local governments,  and to national 
pension  authorities.  For example,  the national  authorities  might  receive  40%, 
provincial  governments  lo%, local governments  lo%, and the national  pension 
system  2O%.l' 8 
Administration  of most  government  stock should be  turned  over  to 
specialists  such as banks  or stock fund managers.l'  Their  main  task will be 
to try to assure  that the firms are run profitably.  Their  stock ownership 
gives  them the ability  to discipline  and replace poor managers.  The division 
of stock ownership  into several hands will make  it difficult  for owners  or 
managers  to engage  in self-dealing  of the sort that  is notorious  of Hungarian 
and Polish  enterprise  managers  (Lipton and Sachs 1990b). 
Most  government  stock should  remain  in government  hands  for the near 
future.  That  satisfies  the cultural  norm that the economy  should not be 
"given away"  to people who will  then be wealthy  and dominant.lg  Nationalism 
makes  foreign buyers  a problem:  some firms should be  sold  to foreign  firms 
with  special  expertise  or to provide  investment capital,  but  selling  firms  to 
foreigners  just  to get them out of the hands of the government  is less 
desirable.  In addition,  government  ownership  adds a social  element  to firms' 
decisionmaking.  Firms will be  less likely to close down plants  or drive hard 
bargains  with workers,  for example.  While  such decisions  may not maximize 
profits,  I believe  that they are deviations  from profit-maximizing  that most 
people  in these countries  will prefer. 
Some stock will be  sold to a broader  public  over time.  Pension  funds 
will need  to sell stock to pay pensions,  assuring  a gradual  and continuing 
release  of shares  to the public.  Governments  will  also want  to sell shares 
for cash, since their tax revenues will be slim and their credit  ratings  low. 
The experience  of government  ownership  of stock in Western  Europe has been 
mixed,  with  fairly poor  in the United  Kingdon and Italy,  and more positive 
results  in West Germany,  Austria  and France."  Some lessons  from that 
experience  are that firms will  inevitably  be turned  into political  tools,  and 9 
yet some will nevertheless  have excellent  managements  and do well.  Lufthansa, 
Volkswagen,  Veba,  Electricite  de France, and Japan Air Lines come to mind, 
along with  the Swiss and French National  railways  and POSCO,  the South Korean 
steel firm that is government-owned  and apparently  the world's most  efficient. 
With both  firms and governments  facing a continuing  need for cash  I 
expect  that firms will  issue new stock and governments  will  sell stock 
regularly.  That assures  a gradual shift of the economy  into private  hands. 
Governments  will want  to sell some assets  quickly  to reduce households'  "cash 
overhang"  but unwilling  to sell a large share of assets  since they greatly 
exceed  the private  sector's purchasing  ability.  Firms  in industries  that lose 
money  in government  hands will  likely be quickly  privatized,  since governments 
will be unwilling  to raise taxes to subsidize  them.  Just as unsuccessful 
privately  owned  firms are reorganized  and "downsized",  unprofitable  publicly 
owned  firms will be reorganized  or sold to make  them profitable.21  Some 
declining  heavy  industries  like steel and coal may remain under government 
control  to avoid closing plants  and laying off workers,  but  that is what  the 
public would want  the government  to do in any case. 
Creating  corporations  but not quickly privatizing  requires  far less 
change  than full privatization,  since there is no current  capitalist  class  in 
these countries  to sell the firms to.  It also requires  a much smaller 
cultural  adjustment,  since a new capitalist  class need not be created.  While 
the public  wants  rapid economic  growth,  few people  in formerly communist 
societies  want  an artificial  new class of wealthy  owners  of capital.22 
However,  many new private  firms will be established  and grow rapidly  as people 
see opportunities  neglected  by the established  firms.  So the private  share  of 
the economy will  grow fast even without  privatization  of large existing  firms. 10 
What will motivate  the managers  of these partly-public  firms?  They will 
face a strict  test of market  profitability,  since cash-strapped  governments 
can hardly  provide  them with funds.  In the post-communist  environment,  making 
a profit  will be a challenge  in itself.  If managers  fail to make  a profit, 
they are likely  to be replaced. 
Large  government-owned  firms will  face as strong  incentives  as 
privatized  firms.  Both will  face severe pressure  to make profits,  since 
neither  will have  a ready source  of additional  funding.  Each will be able to 
appeal  for some government  aid if failure would  devastate  some region--private 
U.S.  firms like Chrysler  and Grumman  have received  large infusions  of 
government  support.  Both will  face foreign and domestic  competition  in the 
long run, which will be the ultimate  test of their viability. 
The specific  form of corporations  and privatization  policies  should vary 
across  Eastern  Europe with each country's  specific  institutions  and culture.23 
A quote  from Soviet writer  and dissident  Amalrik  (1981, p.  37-81,  gives  a 
flavor  of the difficulties  of assuming  that all cultures  are just  like the 
U.S. 
As  I see it, no idea can ever be put into practice  if it is not 
understood  by a majority  of the people.  Whether because  of its historical 
traditions  or for some other reason,  the idea of self-government,  of equality 
before  the law and of personal  freedom-  -and the responsibility  that goes with 
these--are  almost  completely  incomprehensible  to the Russian  people.  Even  in 
the idea of pragmatic  freedom, a Russian  tends to see not so much  the 
possibility  of securing a good life for himself  as the danger  that some clever 
fellow will make good at his expense. 
To the majority  of the people  the very word  "freedom"  is synonymous  with 
"disorder"  or the opportunity  to indulge with  impunity  in some kind  of anti- 
social  or dangerous  activity.  As  for respecting  the rights  of an individual 
as such, the idea simply arouses bewilderment.  One can respect  strength, 
authority,  even intellect or education,  but  it is preposterous  to the popular 
mind  that the human  personality  should  represent  any kind of value. 11 
As a people, we have  not benefited  from Europe's humanist  tradition.  In 
Russian  history man has always been  a means and never  in any  sense an end. 
. . . The Russian  people...have... one idea that appears  positive:  the idea 
of  iustice...  In practice,  "justice"  involves the desire  that  "nobody  should 
live better  than I do"..  .The idea of justice  is motivated  by hatred  of 
everything  that is outstanding,  which we make no effort  to imitate but,  on the 
contrary,  try to bring  down  to our level, by hatred  of any sense of 
initiative,  of any higher  or more dynamic way of life than the life we  live 
ourselves.  This psychology  is, or course, most typical  of the peasantry  and 
least typical of the "middle class".  However, peasants  and  those of peasant 
origin  constitute  the overwhelming  majority  in our country. 
Such cultural values  are sure to affect how a society  can approach  free 
\ 
markets.  I now examine how  cultural values  affect policies  toward private 
farming and large industrial  corporations.24 
Farming conditions  in eastern  Europe vary between  areas  suited  for 
large-scale  grain production  and areas suited to small-scale  fruit and 
vegetable  production.  Either  family or corporate  farming  is technically 
suitable  to the whole  region,  so in the long run private  farming  is the most 
economically  efficient  system.  It could include large family  farms  in grain- 
producing  regions.  It could  include either small-scale  family  farms or large- 
scale corporate  farms using hired workers  to produce  vegetables  and fruit. 
Current  institutions  affect  the acceptable  choices, however.  The Polish 
people  strongly  desire  private,  small-scale  family farming,  and have  organized 
most of their countryside  as such.  Such farms will probably  prevail  for the 
near  future, even though  the farms are inefficiently  small.  Under  free 
markets  most farmers would  be driven  from the land, which  would  be politically 
unacceptable  25  In contrast,  large-scale  farms prevail  in grain-producing 
areas of the Soviet Union  and Bulgaria.  These can be privatized  as units, 
with  the farms having  the option  of subdividing  their land fairly.  It seems 
that Russian  agriculturists  are not ready to establish  family  farms,  so large 12 
corporate  or collective  farming may prevail  there,  and the laws for 
privatizing  Russian  farming  should reflect  that possibility.26  Family-sized 
fruit and vegetable  growing  seems preferred  everywhere,  so the privatization 
of such farming  could be carried out under  standard  "land reform"  rules:  low 
prices,  family  farms,  and limited resale  rights  for several  years. 
Large western  industrial  firms have  numerous  plants  spread  across  a 
number  of countries;  such firms export  a large  share of their output.  They 
must meet world  quality  standards  to export  successfully  and meet  import 
competition.  Communist  firms have not faced  these conditions.  Exports  were 
rarely  determined  in competitive  markets  but were  set bureaucratically.  So 
were  the location  of plants  and the size of firms, making  most  firms national 
monopolists. 
These  conditions  will now break  down.  The  the open economies  of 
Hungary,  Czechoslovakia  and Poland, will  fare differently  from the closed 
Soviet  economy.  The former are close enough  to Western  Europe,  and small 
open enough  that trade with Western  Europe  is critical.  The Soviet Union 
so large and distant  from Western  Europe,  international  transport  is so 
and 
is 
difficult,  and the Soviet  economy  is so closed,  that international  trade will 
likely be a secondary  factor.  In Eastern  Europe,  merging  with  (or more 
likely,  selling  out to) foreign multinationals  should be the quickest  way  for 
firms to increase  efficiency.  Countries  must  decide whether  to allow  such 
mergers  and sales.  They must also decide whether  to protect  their industries 
from imports.  Both a country's  industrial  efficiency  and its nationalistic 
feelings  are important  in this choice.  Hungary  seems most open to foreign 
influence  and competition.  Since its firms have been partially  free for 
decades,  they are more  able to compete  successfully  (Kornai 1990).  Also, 13 
Hungarians  are relatively willing  to accept  foreign ownership  of  industry  and 
are comfortable  with close association  with Austria  and Germany.  So Hungarian 
corporate  law should allow foreign  ownership,  mergers  and takeovers  under  a 
broad  set  of circumstances.  Government  approval  of majority  ownership  of 
large firms by foreigners might be desirable  until the public  reaction  to 
foreign  takeovers becomes  clear. 
Poland's  economy has been  near collapse  in recent years  and the public 
is ready  to take drastic measures  to improve  things.  And entrepreneurs  have 
been  trading heavily with  the West  for years.  There  is rather  strong  Polish 
nationalism  that will oppose  external  control  from Germany  and the Soviet 
Union.  (Control of local firms by U.S. multinationals  or Polish  emigres  would 
be acceptable).  This implies  some government  veto power  over  foreign 
takeovers.  Support for workers'  rights  is strong and has been  reinforced  by 
the Solidarity  trade union.  Finally,  in recent years, workers  have  gained 
strong  legal rights over firms'  decisions.  Poland  is an excellent  candidate 
for a double board of directors  along German  lines, that can accommodate 
strong worker  influence  in one board while maintaining  stockholder  ownership 
in the other board. 
The Soviet Union's  current  political  conflicts  make  it hard  to predict 
politically  appropriate  policies.  But some general principles  can be 
described.  Russians  seem much more hostile  to foreign control  than Eastern 
Europeans,  even though the chance  of foreign domination  seems  slight.  They 
are unfamiliar  with  the management  of firms along capitalist  lines,  and would 
be shocked  at the "ruthlessness"  of profit-maximizing  managers  (Lewin 1988, p. 
140).  The Soviet Union  is the best  candidate  for firms owned by cities, 
provinces  and republics,  and constrained  by  them from pure profit-maximizing 14 
objectives.  The size of the country and its enterprises  reduces  scale-economy 
gains from foreign  mergers.  But foreign firms could enter  and shake up the 
Soviet economy  through new capital  investments  and the purchase  of individual 
factories. 
Some ways  to establish  private property have been  described.  How can 
these rights be defended  by  the rule of law?  Three  levels  of legal rights are 
needed.  First,  constitutional  protections  must assure  that laws will not be 
changed  arbitrarily.  Often,  a sufficient  guarantee  in oractice  is that 
democracy  gives a stable political  equilibrium  assuring  basic  property  rights. 
However,  since  that is not assured  in recently democratized  countries,  such 
constitutional  protections  as prohibiting  the taking  of private  property 
without  just compensation  are essential. 
A second  guarantee  establishes  a formal legal structure  protecting 
property  rights,  including  contracts,  torts and corporate  property  law. 
Former communist  countries  do not have such detailed  laws, and they take many 
years  to develop.  Even eastern  Germany, which just  adopted  West German  law in 
toto, has had great difficulties  in fitting existing  institutions  to its new 
legal system.  Yet  the job must be done, as quickly  as possible.  The most 
efficient  way  to obtain  such a legal system  is to copy one that already  exists 
and works well.  Thus  in the 19th century Japan  adopted  German  legal 
institutions  (Stafford  and Robinson  1990).  A continental  legal system  is most 
appropriate;  the German  legal systema  is a good one to examine.27  m 
continental  legal systems  are consistent  with  the generally  administrative 
approach  to law of communist  governments  and the earlier  institutions  of 
Eastern  European  countries. 15 
The  independence  and impartiality  of the judiciary  are critical  to any 
legal system, particularly  after its distortion  by communist  control.  Every 
country  will need  to recruit new judges  and remove many  communist  appointees. 
Election  of local judges,  as in the U.S., might be an attractive  option. 
The third element of a property  rights  system  is public acceptance.  At 
its best,  the public  actively  supports  the law--notifying  the authorities  of 
theft or embezzlement,  for example.  At the minimum,  the public might 
passively  accept  private property.  But if many  of the public  attack'or  steal 
some types of private property,  that property  will not be viable.  Private 
property  belonging  to "speculators"  and "profiteers"  in the Soviet Union  has 
often been  attacked;  the government must consider  the public's view  of the 
legitimacy  of such property  rather than just deplore  such attacks.28 
In each  former communist  country,  there are grave doubts about  the 
legitimacy  of new enterprises  that may have  "stolen" public  assets  or that may 
be  taking  advantage  of "shortages."  It is desirable  to keep firms from 
gaining  that reputation.  Establishing  publicly  owned corporations  and 
including  workers  among the owner should help  avoid  this sense of 
illegitimacy.  Small firms should have  their assets  sold to the public  at 
auction  and have  their inputs  (food, building  materials)  available  on free 
wholesale  markets.2g 
4.  Culture  and Creating New Markets  and Market  Institutions 
Certain  markets  can operate without  much  institutional  structure. 
People  inspect  the goods, pay cash, and take the goods away with  them.  Farm 
produce  and much  retailing  can work  this way.  Other markets  develop  a 16 
contract  structure  that is effectively  an institution.  Following  Eggertsson 
(1990, p. 175), cultural variations  can be defined  in terms of contracting 
costs.  Past experience  leads to institution-specific  knowledge,  which  imply 
quasirents  in firms and institutions.  Following Becker  and Stigler,  people 
may develop  tastes for institutions  that they are familiar  with  and understand 
well.  So different  countries  have  low costs for different  institutions:  that 
is, essentially,  "culture". 
Most  large Eastern  European  firms do not require  specific  laws'to 
enforce  their contracts,  so they can develop new forms of contracts  from 
scratch without  government  aid.30  But governments  can influence  these 
institutions  by passing  appropriate  laws.  Governments  could  signal  that 
bribery  of public  officials  is strongly prohibited.  Governments  could  also 
discourage  private kickbacks  to workers  at other private  firms,  to reduce  the 
general  acceptance  of corruption  in society.  Finally,  enforcing  private 
contracts  between  firms should be made easy, while unilateral  breaking  of 
contracts  should  involve full compensation  for harm,  Recently  in communist 
economies  the expectation  has been  that contracts are points  to begin 
bargaining  from, not final agreements.  That is not acceptable  in an economy 
of independent  firms, and that expectation  must be broken  down. 
Labor markets  always need  an institutional  underpinning,  whether  of 
custom,  labor unions,  or laws.  Customary  practices  have been  inefficient  and 
unfair  in communist  states, while  labor unions have had  real power  only 
recently  in Poland.  Laws seem needed  to develop new  institutions.  In the 
past, workers  had few effective  rights except  to avoid hard work  (Berg 1990). 
Managers  had few means  of gaining  effective  cooperation.31  The relative 17 
rights  of workers  and management  involve complex  issues  in disparate  fields 
that nevertheless  must be consistent.  For example,  safety  regulations,  union 
shop rights,  and workers  compensation  all deal with  the same problems  of 
efficiency  and safety;  each approach affects  the others.  Therefore,  it seems 
best  to copy the laws of a country with a successful  system  of labor law. 
Workers'  rights  should be strong regarding  unfair  dismissal,  to accord with 
socialist values.  But they should not be  so strong  that firms cannot  fire 
malingerers  or troublemakers  or cut down money-losing  operations;  these are 
all major problems  that firms must be able to confront  effectively.  So while 
Dutch  law very  effectively  protects workers  from dismissal,  a poorly motivated 
labor force could  take advantage  of it.  German  labor  law may have  the best 
combination  of fairness  toward workers  and a recognition  of the need for 
efficiency  and flexibility.  Austrian  and Swedish  institutions  emphasize 
bargaining  between  "peak" organizations  of workers,  firms and the government; 
in countries  with  a strong  sense of solidarity  among  elites,  such as 
Czechoslovakia,  this model may be useful  (Calmfors and Nymoen  1990, Jackman, 
Pissarides  and Savouri  1990).  For laid off workers,  Sweden has had an 
effective  (but controversial)  combination  of high benefits  and strong 
incentives  to find new jobs  (Flanagan 1987, Johannesson  1981).  The German 
laws regarding  unions  might be appropriate  for Poland  or Czechoslovakia,  but 
where  real popular  unions  do not yet exist weaker  rules are appropriate. 
Since workers  are  familiar with  the current  rules,  a reasonable  beginning  is 
actually  to enforce  the current  laws, until  their defects become  clear.  This 
applies particularly  to the Soviet Union,  where  workers  are quite unfamiliar 
with western  concepts  of labor law but have  sometimes  tried to have  their own 
labor laws enforced. 18 
The transition  to markets may require  some intermediate  steps  in the 
country  that is most autonomous  from the Western  European  economy,  the Soviet 
Union,  and perhaps  in the Balkan  states.  Prices and output  levels  are very 
far from their long-run  equilibrium  levels.  Therefore,  there  is a good chance 
that when prices  are freed, they would  shoot up  (or down),  and quantities 
could  easily  change  drastically.  Firms could easily be bankrupted  when  caught 
by whipsawing  prices,  even though eventually  they would be profitable.  The 
IMF/World  Bank/OECD/EBRD  recommended  that some Soviet prices,  particularly 
housing,  energy  and utility  prices, be controlled  for a number  of years  (1991, 
Volume  2, p. 10). 
This problem  can be solved by allowing  prices  to adjust  in a constrained 
fashion,  controlling  the aggregate price  level or a sectoral  price  level, 
while  letting  individual  prices  adjust  consistent  with  that constraint.  MAP-- 
the Market  Anti-inflation  Plan, is such a mechanism  devised by Abba  Lerner  and 
David  Colander  (1980).  Similar  systems  controlling  wages have been  used by 
Hungary  over the past decade  including  its recent recent price  reform  and in 
Poland's  "big bang".  They are proposed  by the IMF/World Bank/OECD/EBRD  (1990, 
1991) to stabilize  the Soviet economy:  "incomes policy  seems  indispensable  at 
least  for the transition"  (1990, p. 2).32  MAP and related  sectoral  policies 
allow  for adjustment  in prices  toward  their equilibrium  level, while  in effect 
taxing  such changes.  That reduces  the size of price changes,  but  allows 
prices  to move  toward  their long-run  equilibrium.  Equally  important,  these 
mechanisms  can assure  that the aggregate  price  level, or some sectoral  price 
level such as consumer  durables  or energy,  stays at a set level, while 
allowing  efficient  removal of price distortions  for either  the whole  economy 
or within  the specific  sector. 19 
Traditional  incomes policies  discriminate  against workers,  by 
constraining  wages but not  returns  to capital.  That may be politically  as 
well  as economically  inappropriate.  MAP, which controls value  added,  is 
unbiased  and so is a fairer and more  efficient policy  tool.  Incomes policies 
constrain  an individual  firm's wages,  so a firm facing a shortage  of workers 
is largely unable  to adjust.  MAP  lets such a firm raise  its wages  if it pays 
another  firm with a labor surplus  to reduce  its average wage.  Price controls 
cause similar problems  for firms;  again MAP creates a market  in thexright  to 
increase  prices,  letting a firm raise its prices  if other  firms are willing  to 
reduce  their prices by an equal amount  (Koford 1987). 
A related mechanism  sets a constraint  on aggregate  output  of a category 
of good, such as trucks, while  allowing  for adjustment  of the number  of 
individual  types of trucks.  Again,  firms that cut back  output  of all sorts 
must pay other firms to expand.  This allows  flexibility  in adjusting  to 
demands while  still assuring  that the overall  industry continues  to produce. 
As  individual prices  and quantities  adjust under  this mechanism,  markets  will 
approach  their long-run  equilibrium  and the aggregate  constraints  can be 
adjusted  (Koford, Miller  and Colander  1990).  These policies  can also be used 
to assure  long-term price  stability  and a stable aggregate  GNP level. 
Finally,  the Eastern  European  countries  nearest  the West  can just  let 
capitalist  market  institutions  freely enter the country.  This  gives them 
directly  a set of efficient  and fairly  compatible  institutions.  Hungary  and 
Czechoslovakia  are the most  likely  to accept Austrian  or German  institutions. 
How might  they do so?  Firms need various  of types of insurance--fire, 
casualty,  workers'  compensation,  product  liability.  Rather  than set up their 
own regulations,  the governments  could allow insurance  from neighboring 20 
countries  to be offered  freely.  Then those countries'  rules  and formats would 
be adopted  immediately.  Similar principles  apply  to the full range of legal 
institutions,  perhaps  even allowing  legal issues  to be determined  by their 
neighbor's  courts. 
5.  A Middle  Path:  Summary 
This paper  argues  for a move to market-based  economies  that preserve 
elements  of a socially  conscious  society, and thus  is a kind  of "middle way" 
between  pure  capitalism  and socialism.  The proposal  has a "big bang"  for 
establishing  private  property  rights and market  competition  immediately.  But 
full private  ownership  of large firms is deferred.  Instead,  governments 
create  strong  incentives  for firms to operate  profitably  and efficiently. 
Governments  sell stock when  they want the revenue  or believe  that private 
ownership  would  increase  a firm's efficiency.  Society  then can choose  to move 
to the sort of market-based  economy  that its public  prefers.  Before  full 
privatization,  it should develop  full legal  institutions  and  the socially 
conscious  regulations  that the society wants.  People  in different  countries 
have quite  different  preferences  on government  ownership  and the strength  of a 
"social" market  economy.  This proposal  leaves each country  free to choose. 
In developing  markets,  the critical policy  is to assure  that the markets 
operate  freely.  Yet markets  require some institutional  framework  that 
organizes  that freedom.  This proposal  favors  the rapid creation  of markets 
and so the adoption  of successful  institutional  rules  from other countries. 
At the same time, each country must  look to find or develop  rules consistent 
with  its culture,  past  institutions,  and aspirations. REFERENCES 
Applebaum,  Anne,  "Rapid Reform  is the Solution--Not  Problem--in  Poland,"  Wall 
Street  Journal,  December  24, 1990, p. 7. 
Bates,  Robert  H., Markets  and States  in Tropical  Africa:  The Political  Base 
of Agricultural  Policies,  University  of California  Press,  1981. 
Berg, Ger P. van  den, "Developments  in Soviet Labor Law under Gorbachev,"  in 
A.J.  Schmidt,  ed., The Impact  of Perestroika  on Soviet Law, Kluwer, 
1990. 
Berliner,  Joseph  S., The Innovation  Decision  in Soviet  Industry, MIT  Press, 
Cambridge,  Mass.,  1976. 
Bhagwati,  Jagdish,  "Directly Unproductive  Profit-Seeking  Activities,"  Journal 
of Political  Economy,  90, October  1982.  \ 
Bonin, John  P. and Louis Putterman,  Economics  of Cooperation  and the Labor- 
Managed  Economy, Harwood,  1987. 
Calmfors,  Lars and Ragnar Nymoen,  "Real Wage Adjustment  and Employment 
Policies  in the Nordic  Countries,"  Economic  Policv  5:397-448,  October 
1990. 
Club  "Economics  2000", The Economic  Reform  in Bulgaria:  Analysis, 
Estimations.  Tendencies,  Institute  of Economics,  Bulgarian  Academy  of 
Sciences,  Sofia, May  1991. 
Demsetz,  Harold,  "Toward a Theory  of Property  Rights,"  American  Economic 
Review,  57~347-360,  May  1967. 
Dhanji,  Farid,  "Transformation  Programs:  Content  and Sequencing,"  American 
Economic  Review,  81:323-8, May  1991. 
Dyba, Karel  and Jan Svejnar,  "Czechoslovakia:  Recent  Economic  Developments 
and Prospects,"  American  Economic  Review,  57:185-90, May  1991. 
Economist,  "Survey of the Soviet Union,"  October  20, 1990. 
Edwards,  Richard,  Contested  Terrain,  Free Press, New York,  1978. 
Eggertsson,  Thrdinn,  Economic Behavior  and Institutions,  Cambridge:  Cambridge 
University  Press, 1990. 
Estrin,  Saul and Virginie  Perotin,  "Does Ownership  Always  Matter?"  Inter- 
national  Journal  of Industrial  Organization  9:55-72, March  1991. 
Flanagan,  Robert  J.,  "Efficiency  and Equality  in Swedish Labor Markets,"  in 
Barry  P. Bosworth  and Alice M. Rivlin,  eds., The Swedish  Economy, 
Brookings,  1987. 
Frydman,  Roman,  Stanislaw W. Wellisz  and Grzegorz  Kolodko,  "Stabilization  in 
Poland:  A Progress Report,"  Columbia University,  Discussion  Paper 481, 
May  1990. Granick,  David, Job Rights  in the Soviet Union:  Their  Consequences,  Cambridge 
University  Press, 1986. 
Gultekin,  N. Bulent,  "Privatization  in Poland,"  speech  given at University  of 
Pennsylvania,  April  11, 1991. 
Hewett,  Ed A.,  "Prognosis  for Soviet  Economy  Is Grave, but  Improving,"  New 
York Times, March  25, 1990, p. E3. 
Hosking,  Geoffrey,  The Awakening  of the Soviet Union,  Harvard  University 
Press,  1990. 
International  Monetary  Fund, World  Bank, Organization  for Economic  Co- 
operation  and Development,  European  Bank for Reconstruction  and 
Development,  The Economv  of the USSR:  Summary  and Recommendations, 
World  Bank, Washington,  D.C.,  1990 
International  Monetary  Fund, World  Bank, Organization  for Economic  Co-, 
operation  and Development,  European  Bank for Reconstruction  and 
Development,  A Studv of the Soviet Economv, World  Bank, Washington, 
D.C., February  1991. 
Ioffe,  Olimpiad  S., Soviet Civil Law, Martinus  Nijhoff  Publishers,  Dordrecht, 
The Netherlands,  1988. 
Jackman,  Richard,  Christopher  Pissarides  and Sawas  Savouri,  "Labour Market 
Policies  and Unemployment  in the OECD," Economic  Policv  5:449-490, 
October  1990. 
Johannesson,  Jan,  "On the Composition  of Swedish Labor Market  Policy,"  in 
Gunnar  Eliasson,  Bertil  Homlund  and Frank P. Stafford,  eds.,  Studies  in 
Labor Market  Behavior:  Sweden  and the United  States,  Industrial 
Institute  for Economics  and Social Research,  Stockholm,  1981. 
Klaus,  Vaclav,  "A Perspective  on Economic  Transition  in Czechosolvakia  and 
Eastern Europe,"  in Stanley  Fischer, Dennis  de Tray and Shekhar  Shah, 
eds., Proceedinps  of the World  Bank Annual  Conference  on Development 
Economics  1990, World  Bank,  1991. 
Klitgaard,  Robert, Tropical  GanEzsters:  One Man's  Experience  with Development 
and Decadence  in DeeDest Africa,  Basic Books, New York,  1990. 
Koford,  Kenneth,  "Some Short-Run  Microeconomics  of an Incentive  Anti-Inflation 
Plan,"  Public Finance Ouarterlv  15:199-218,  1987. 
Koford,  Kenneth,  and Jeffrey  B. Miller,  "The Natural  Rate and Adjustment  to 
Shocks  in an Efficiency-Wage  Share Economy,"  Journal  of Macroeconomics, 
March  1991. 
Koford,  Kenneth J., Jeffrey  B. Miller  and David C. Colander,  "Application  of 
Market  Incentive  Plans  to Transition  in a Socialist  Economy,"  Delaware 
working  paper  90-32, September  1990. 
Kolchin,  Peter, Unfree  Labor:  American  Slaverv and Russian  Serfdom,  Harvard 
University  Press, Cambridge,  Mass.,  1987. Kornai,  Janos,  The Road  to a Free Economy, Norton,  New York,  1990. 
Kreps,  David,  "Corporate  Culture  and Economic Theory,"  in James  E. Alt and 
Kenneth  A.  Shepsle,  eds., Perspectives  on Positive  Political  Economy, 
Cambridge  University  Press,  1990. 
Lerner,  Abba  P. and David  C. Colander, MAP:  A Market  Anti-Inflation  Plan, 
Harcourt,  Brace Jovanovich,  1980. 
Lewin,  Moshe,  The Gorbachev  Phenomenon:  A Historical  Interpretation, 
University  of California  Press, Berkeley,  1988. 
Lipton,  David  and Jeffrey  Sachs,  "Creating a Market  Economy  in Eastern  Europe: 
The Case of Poland,"  Brookinzs  Papers on Economic  Activity,  1, pp.  75- 
134, 1990a. 
Lipton,  David  and Jeffrey  Sachs,  "Privatization  in Eastern  Europe:  The Case 
of Poland,"  Brookinas  Papers on Economic Activity,  2, 293-333,  1990b. 
Litwack,  John,  "What Does Price Theory  Suggest for Socialist  Reform?," 
presented  at the annual meetings  of the American  Economic  Association, 
December  1989. 
McKinnon,  Ronald,  Wall  Street Journal January  1990. 
McKinnon,  Ronald,  The Order  of Economic Liberalization,  Johns Hopkins 
University  Press,  forthcoming  1991. 
Murrell,  Peter,  "Evolution  in Economics  and in the Economic  Reform  of the 
Centrally  Planned  Economies,"  University  of Maryland,  May  1991. 
Nelson,  Richard  R.,  "Assessing  Private Enterprise:  An Exegesis  of Tangled 
Doctrine,"  Bell Journal  of Economics  12:93-111,  Spring  1981. 
Nordhaus,  William  D.,  "Soviet Economic Reform:  The Longest  Road,"  BrookinPs 
Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1, pp. 297-308,  1990. 
North,  Douglass  C., Institutions.  Institutional  Change  and Economic 
Performance,  Cambridge  University  Press,  1990. 
North,  Douglass  C., and Robert  Paul Thomas,  The Rise  of the Western  World:  A 
New Economic  History,  Cambridge University  Press,  1973. 
North,  Douglass  C. and Barry R. Weingast,  "The Evolution  of Institutions 
Governing  Public  Choice  in 17th Century  England,"  Journal  of Economic 
History,  49:803-32,  1989. 
Petr, Jerry  L.,  "'New Thinking'  in the Soviet Economy:  Lessons  for Western 
Political  Economists,"  Journal  of Economic  Issues  24:981-994,  December 
1990. 
Pryor,  Frederic  M.,  Property  and Industrial  Organization  in Communist  and 
Capitalist  Nations,  Indiana University  Press,  1971. Scherer,  Frederick M. and David Ross,  Industrial  Market  Structure  and Economic 
Performance,  3rd edition, Houghton  Mifflin,  Boston,  1990. 
Shiller,  Robert J., Maxim Boycko  and Vladimir  Korobov,  "Popular Attitudes 
Towards  Free Markets:  The Soviet Union  and the United  States  Compared," 
Cowles  Foundation  Discussion  Paper No. 952, Yale University,  August 
1990.  American  Economic Review  81:385-400,  June  1991. 
Shipler,  David K., Russia:  Broken  Idols.  Solemn Dreams, Times  Books,  1989. 
Shlapentokh,  Vladimir,  Soviet Public Opinion  and Ideolozv,  Praeger,  1986. 
Shlapentokh,  Vladimir,  Soviet  Ideologies  in the Period of Glasnost,  Praeger, 
1988. 
Smith,  Hedrick,  The New Russians,  Random  House,  New York,  1990. 
Soto, Hernando  de, The Other Path:  The Invisible  Revolution  in the Third 
World,  Harper  & Row, New York,  1988. 
Stafford,  Frank P. and Malcolm  Robinson,  "Industrial  Growth  and Social 
Institutions,"  in John E. Jackson,  ed., Institutions  in American 
Societv:  Essavs  in Market.  Political,  and Social Organizations, 
University  of Michigan  Press, Ann Arbor,  1990. 
Telgarsky,  Jeffrey  P. and Raymond J. Struyk, Toward  a Market-Oriented  Housing 
Sector  in Eastern Europe, Urban  Institute  Press, Washington,  D.C.,  1990. 
Tismaneanu,  Vladimir,  The Crisis of Marxist  Ideologv  in Eastern  Europe:  The 
Povertv  of Utopia,  Routledge,  London,  1988. 
Tullock,  Gordon,  “I Favor Napoleon,"  197?. 
Vanek,  Jaroslav,  The General Theory  of Labor-Managed  Market  Economies,  Cornell 
University  Press,  Ithaca, 1970. 
Weitzman,  Martin,  "Some Macroeconomic  Implications  of Alternative  Compensation 
Systems,"  Economic Journal  93:763-83,  December  1983. 
Wilson,  James Q., Bureaucracv,  Basic Books,  New York,  1989. 
Zald, Mayer  N.,  "History, Sociology,  and Theories  of Organization,"  in John  E. 
Jackson,  ed., Institutions  in American  Societv:  Essavs  in Market, 
Political.  and Social Orzanizations,  University  of Michigan  Press,  Ann 
Arbor,  1990. 
Zaslavskaya,  Tatyana  I., "Friends or Foes?  Social Forces Working  For and 
Against  Perestroika,"  in Abel G. Aganbegyan,  ed., Perestroika  1989, 
Scribners,  New York,  1988. 
Zaslavskaya,  Tatyana,  The Second  Socialist  Revolution:  An Alternative  Soviet 
Strategy,  Indiana University  Press,  1990. Discussions  at the Vassar  College  economics workshop  and the WEA meetings  were 
extremely  helpful.  I am thankful  to David Kennett,  John Litwack,  Jeffrey 
Miller,  Hyman Minsky  and Jerry  Schneider  for helpful  comments. 
Endnotes 
1.  See,  e.g.,  Lipton  and  Sachs  (1990),  Nordhaus  (1990),  Sachs  (1991)  and 
comments by Hewett  (following Nordhaus) and Kornai  (following Lipton and Sachs). 
I have  heard  numerous  verbal  statements  from,  e.g.,  Ed Hewett,  Herb  Levine, 
Richard  Ericson.  Editorialists  have applauded  the big bang approach  and Vaclav 
Klaus' Friedmanite  ideas,  while criticizing  those favoring slower change  (e.g., 
Applebaum  1990, Economist  1990, p. 13). 
2.  For  example,  both  the  English  common  law and  the  continental  "Napoleonic 
Code"  seem  able  to  protect  private  property  and  allow  free  transfers.  See 
generally, Demsetz (1967), North (1990) and Tullock (19  ), and more specifically 
Pryor  (1971, esp. Chapter  9) and Eggertsson's  (1990) impressive  review. 
3. Even when the Hungarian  elite largely agreed on the need  for marketization, 
their  short-term  practical  decisions,  which  reflected  immediate  self-interest 
and  also  traditional  problem-solving,  led to an extension  of central  controls 
(Richet 1988). 
4.  Wilson  (1989,  pp.  160,  337)  shows  how  bureaus  can  cope  well  with 
straightforward,  routinized  tasks.  He also shows how they can develop a strong 
and well-motivated  cadre  if given  an appropriate  mission.  Unfortunately,  the 
existing  bureaucracies  in  former  communist  states  rarely  seem  to  have  such 
values,  so  only newly  instituted  agencies might  do a good job. 
5. It is clear  that effective  banks  will  take many years  to develop.  Credit- 
worthiness  standards must be learned and developed,  and loan officers must gain 
experience.  Firms must  develop  a credit  history,  first with  small  short-term 
loans.  Thus,  banks  cannot  play  a major  role  in providing  finance  to  these 
economies. 
6. See, e.g., Estrin and Perotin  (1991), and Eggertsson  (1990, Chapter  5).  The 
extent  of innovation, however,  will vary. 
7.  Even when entry and exit are not free, but some entry and exit are possible, 
markets  should  be  workably  competitive  (Murrell  1991).  Most  European  and 
Japanese  firms are not free to lay off workers,  close plants,  or even shut down 
in bankruptcy,  and markets  there  are arguably  far from perfectly  competitive. 
Yet most  observers  regard  those markets  as reasonably  close  to the competitive 
ideal. 
8. Nelson  (1981) has an eloquent  discussion.  The market  need not be even close 
to  perfectly  competitive  (see  Scherer  and  Ross  1990).  Freedom  of  entry  is 
probably  the most  important  condition,  but even regulated  monopolies  have been 
innovative  (e.g., AT&T  and electric  utilities). 
9.  It  is only  fair  to point  out  that  the communist  countries  turned  in very 
rapid  growth  rates  for  many  years,  contrary  to  the  arguments  of  economic 
theorists. 10. Smith  (1990) describes  how Soviets enjoy breaking  laws, playing  a "cat and 
mouse  game"  with  the  authorities.  Much  of  Gorbachev's  effort  has  gone  to 
developing  more  respect  for law, but he has  not  been  very  successful.  Ioffe 
(1988, pp.  14, 55) describes  the Soviet legal system  as backward. 
11. See Lipton  and  Sachs  (1990b).  Vaclav  Klaus  (1991) has  been  the strongest 
Eastern  European  proponent  of such a policy. 
12. These obstacles  include the lack of sufficient capital among citizens to buy 
the assets,  the complete  absence  of any idea of their value  when  the economies 
are freed up,  the complexity  of any sale, auction  or distribution  of claims  to 
assets,  and  the distributional  question  of whether  some people  should  receive 
some assets as a matter of right (workers, for example).  The IMF/World Bank/OECD 
report  (1990, p. 17) describes  these issues for the Soviet Union  and concludes 
that  the  most  rapid  privatization  of  large-scale  assets  "is  likely  to  be 
protracted".  Kornai  (1990, p. 91) favors gradual privatization,  despite a desire 
to move as rapidly  as possible,  since rapid privatization  would  leadlto  severe 
political  and economic  difficulties.  Dhanji  (1991, p. 326) shows how ,Poland's 
"big bang"  failed  to make  rapid progress  in privatization,  and is now becoming 
a gradual privatization  due to the obstacles  noted  above. 
In Eastern Europe where previous owners of real property demand its return, 
uncertainty  regarding  ownership  will  continue  until  these  claims  are resolved 
politically. 
13. Poland  has  now  leased  or  sold over  100,000  small  private  shops  (Gultekin 
1991). 
14. It is fortunately not necessary to define the overall legal rules, regarding, 
say  pollution,  while  defining  each  corporation's  individual  ownership. 
Nevertheless,  deciding  workers'  rights in corporations  will be a difficult  and 
protracted  political  decision  in Eastern Europe  (Lipton and Sachs 1990b). 
It  is not  clear  how  difficult  it will  be  to  define  each  corporation's 
property  rights.  All  communist  enterprises  nominally  have  owned  their  real 
property,  although  the military may own some factories  that are leased to firms, 
(as the U.S.  military  does).  Larger  difficulties  arise  over  financial  assets 
and liabilities  and contractual  obligations.  Loan renewal  terms have not been 
spelled out.  Conditions  of foreclosure  do not exist,  either  in general  law or 
in specific contracts.  Obligations to  provide workers with health and recreation 
facilities  are  real but vague.  Warranties  and product  liability  are unclear, 
even  for  such  large  interfirm  contracts  as  rolling  mills,  mining  equipment, 
computers  and aircraft. 
15.  See, e.g., McKinnon  (1990). 
16. The proportion  to be  sold  to the public  depends  partly  on the size of the 
"ruble overhang"  of liquid  savings available  for investment. 
17.  A uniform  rule permits  a large number  of firms  to be  dealt with  at once. 
Ongoing  Polish  experience  suggests  that the moderate  sized  firms can be  dealt 
with  this way, but  that the very large firms must be  treated  as special  cases. 
18.  This  reduces  the problem  of finding  able board  members.  Bulent  Gultekin 
(1991) points  out that with  8000 firms to privatize  in Poland,  perhaps  120,000 
board  directors  must be appointed,  which  is a major  task in itself. Political patronage dispensed  through Italian and French government-owned 
firms has been a major problem.  An administrative  level separating  firms  from 
government  would  reduce  patronage  but  not  prevent  open  political  policy 
decisions. 
19.  The  plans  to  give  stock  to  "everyone"  in  Poland  and  Czechoslovakia 
necessarily  require  setting  up  some  kind  of  holding  companies  or  investment 
trusts.  Their  supervision  of  thousands  of  firms  that  they  own  stock  in  is 
certain  to be more  theoretical  than real.  That will provide managers  of these 
firms with  the opportunity  to run their  firms as  they please,  so  long as they 
do not need  to borrow. 
20. Canada's  (and Quebec's) experience  also appears to be relatively  favorable. 
21. Italian and UK experience might  contradict  this optimistic  view. 
22.  If Hungarian  and  Polish  experience  is a guide,  the public  is  happy  with 
entrepreneurs  who become wealthy  from innovations,  such as computer  software  or 
Rubik's  cube.  But they are very  suspicious  of those who gain wealth  from firms 
based  on former government property.  Kornai  (1990) emphasizes  this opposition 
to new wealth  as a major political  obstacle  to be overcome. 
23.  Some  useful  references  on  cultural  values  in  the  Soviet  Union  include 
Hosking  (1990), Lewin  (1988)  (on the values  of  the new  educated  urban  elite, 
compared to the previous peasant culture), Petr (1990) (on the thinking of Soviet 
liberals),  Shipler  (1989),  Shlapentoch  (1986,  1988)  (on the  thinking  of  the 
Soviet elite and public). 
Tismaneanu  (1988) describes  well  the  state  of mind  of  Eastern  European 
intellectuals,  one that is strongly  anti-Stalinist  and anti-authoritarian,  and 
quite  strongly  disillusioned  by  the  experience  of  communist  ideology.  The 
Bulgarian  liberal  economic  reformers  of Club  "Economics  2000" noted  (1991, p. 
22) that for workers  "the attitude  toward  the state as the only benefactor  and 
defender of people's  interests has remained unchanged...in  solving unemployment 
problems.. .3.5 percent  [recognize]  the role of firms, but  60 percent  give  the 
highest  rating  to the state." 
One  can  also  overemphasize  the  importance  of  culture  in a  society,  and 
neglect  the  specific  situational  factors  that  actually  may  create  apparently 
"cultural"  behaviors.  Wildavsky  argues  that  there  are a variety  of  cultural 
preferences  in every society;  it is the relative mix  that varies. 
24. Urban  land policy  should  also be  addressed,  but  I am too ignorant  of this 
important  subject  even to attempt  some comments. 
25. Presumably,  when these facts sink in, Poland will adopt some subsidy  system 
for farmers comparable  to that adopted  in the U.S.  or the EC. 
Possibly, most small farmers  could  take jobs  in local factories  and farm 
as a part-time  occupation.  But there are not currently  enough  rural  factories 
for this to succeed. 
26. Some farmers would like to have their own land, but most are quite concerned 
about their loss of security  (Smith 1990 pp.  226-9). 
27. The French legal system might also be appropriate.  I know little about other 
continental  systems.  It is striking  that the Czechoslovakian  parliament  wrote its own economic  laws rather  than copying German  or EC laws because  the latter 
were  to detailed  to enact readily  (Dyba and Svejnar  1991, p. 187). 
28. The Soviet trading cooperatives  were closed due to these attacks, even though 
they were performing  a highly  useful  service  (Smith 1990 p. 289). 
Shiller,  Boycko  and  Korobov  (1990) present  survey  evidence  that  Soviet 
citizens  do  not  have  very  different  values  regarding  speculation  than  do 
Americans.  But  their  evidence  shows  that  Soviets  are  more  favorable  to 
government  action  against  speculators. 
29. The  latter was  the Soviet  objective  in establishing  markets  for wholesale 
trade. 
30. Contracts  will  develop  even  if governments  don't  enforce  them, maintained 
by the need for continuing  relationships.  But long-term contracts  for, say, gas 
pipelines, will need government  support.  So will contracts  involving patentable 
products.  \ 
31. Granick  (1986) discusses  the customary  rights of Soviet workers. 
32. The specific mechanisms  adopted  recently by Poland  and the Soviet Union  to 
control wage  increases have  severe  technical  flaws. 